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United States v. Jordan Linn Graham: Can we try this again? 
 
Connor Walker 
 Nos. DA 14-30062 and DA 15-30079 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Oral Argument: Tuesday, November 3, 2015 at 9:00 AM in the Pioneer 
Courthouse, Portland, Oregon. 
 
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
Did the District Court err in denying Defendant Jordan Linn 
Graham’s motion to supplement the record with draft jury instructions? 
 Did the District Court err in denying Graham’s motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea because the prosecution’s plea deal was offered 
in bad faith? 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
   On Sunday, July 7, 2013, Jordon Linn Graham pushed her 
husband Cody Johnson to his death over a ledge in Glacier National 
Park.1 They had been married for only eight days.2 Graham initially told 
her friends, family, and investigating police that her husband had left in 
an unfamiliar dark car.3 Several days into the missing persons 
investigation, she fabricated an email from “Tony” in an attempt to 
misdirect suspicion from herself.4 After being confronted with the 
multiple contradictions in her story, Graham finally confessed on July 
16th to causing Cody’s death.5 
 Graham was charged in federal court with both first- and second-
degree murder.6  On the fourth day of a jury trial, Graham accepted a 
plea offer and pled guilty to second-degree murder.7   
The parties negotiated the plea deal while proposed jury 
instructions were being prepared concerning a recorded statement that 
Graham had made to FBI investigators. When the recorded statement 
was introduced, the defense objected that it was “both incomplete and 
unfairly obtained.”8 While allowing the statement into the record, the 
                                           
1 Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Jordan Linn Graham (D. Mont. Mar. 18, 
2014) (No. 9:13–cr–13–37–M–DWM) [hereinafter Defs.’ Sentencing Mem.]. 
2 Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, June 5, 2015, No. 15-30079. 
3 Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, 5–6, United States v. Jordan Linn Graham (D. Mont. 
Mar. 8, 2014) (No. 9:13–cr–13–37–M–DWM) [hereinafter Govt’s Sentencing Mem.]. 
4 Govt’s Sentencing Mem., at 7. 
5 Def.’s Sentencing Mem., at 23. 
6 Opening Br. of Def.-App., at 2. 
7 Opening Br. of Def.-App., at 2. 
8 Opening Br. of Def.-App., at 3. 
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trial court ruled that it would give cautionary instructions to the jury 
concerning the completeness of the recordings.9 The Court prepared two 
draft jury instructions and shared them with counsel.10 At this late stage 
of the trial, the parties agreed to the plea deal and the jury was 
discharged.  
At sentencing, the United States recommended life 
imprisonment,11 claiming Graham had likely planned the murder.12 The 
prosecution argued that Graham’s “nine-day campaign to lie as to her 
involvement” during the murder investigation further supported an 
enhanced sentence.13 Though she had no prior criminal record, her 
“calculating behavior” and her young age increased the danger of 
recidivism.14 The defense countered that by pleading guilty to second-
degree murder, it was “conclusively established” that the murder was 
unintentional.15  Graham’s false statements to investigators were a 
product of her fears, not an intentional campaign to deceive.16 Because 
the facts were unique, general deterrence should not be considered, and a 
10-year sentence with five years of supervised release would be most 
appropriate.17 The trial court sentenced her to a 365-month term18, which 
is the maximum recommended sentence under Federal sentencing 
guidelines.19 At sentencing, the judge said Graham is a dishonest person 
who showed little remorse for killing her husband and has been 
“impervious to the human consequences of what she did.”20 The defense 
then filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea,21 which was denied.22 
Graham appeals her conviction and sentence for the second-
degree murder of Cody Johnson and the denial of her motion to 
supplement the record. 
 III. ARGUMENTS 
 
                                           
9 Answering Br. of Appellee, 1, July 22, 2015, No. DA 15–30079. 
10 Opening Br. of Def.-App, 4. 
11 Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem., at 2.  
12 Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem., at 22. 
13 Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem., at 24. 
14 Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem., at 26–27. 
15 Defs.’ Sentencing Mem., at 37. 
16 Defs.’ Sentencing Mem. at 39–40. 
17 Defs.’ Sentencing Mem. at 42. 
18 Judgment, United States v. Jordan Linn Graham (D. Mont. Mar. 27, 2014) (No. 9:13–cr–13–37–
M–DWM) [hereinafter Trial Judgment]. 
19 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.2 (2014). 
20 Alice Miller, Judge sentences bride to 30 years for Glacier Park murder, Missoulian (March 27, 
2014, 10:00 PM MDT), http://perma.cc/8KZ3-5BM7. 
21 Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty, United States v. Jordan Linn Graham (D. Mont. 
Mar. 25, 2014) (No. 9:13–cr–13–37–M–DWM) [hereinafter Def’s Mot. to Withdraw Plea]. 
22 Def’s Mot. to Withdraw Plea. 
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Issue 1: The defense seeks to amend the record by including the 
draft jury instructions that were circulated to counsel before the plea deal 
was reached.  
Issue 2: Graham appeals her judgment, based on the District 
Court’s denial of her motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
 




The District Court denied Graham’s motion to modify the record 
to include the draft jury instructions.23 She argues that these instructions 
show “inferentially” that the plea agreement was offered in bad faith.24 
The proposed jury instructions made the prosecution fear they would 
gain only a third-degree murder conviction—or even that they would 
lose outright—if either instruction were given to the jury.  This, the 
defense argues, is the rationale behind the prosecution’s “11th hour” plea 
offer.25 
The prosecution’s alleged concern underpins Graham’s second 
argument: the prosecution wanted to “have its cake and eat it too” by 
arguing for premeditation at sentencing while avoiding the risk of an 
acquittal on the first-degree murder charge.26 Thus, the plea agreement 
was offered with bad faith because the prosecution intended to achieve a 
first-degree murder sentence by arguing premeditation at sentencing, 
even though a jury had not found premeditation. Graham further argues 
that this bad faith violated her constitutional due process protections, 
since a jury must find for all elements of the crime, and premeditation is 
an element of first-degree murder.27 
The prosecution counters that because Graham had pled out 
before the jury heard any instructions, there was no reason to include the 
draft instructions in the record.28 Additionally, the Court’s ruling that 
there would be cautionary instructions was a part of the record, rendering 
amendment superfluous.29 The prosecution’s reasons for entering into the 
plea are irrelevant to her appeal and therefore Graham’s entire motion is 
“irrelevant and immaterial.”30  
 
                                           
23 Order Denying Motion to Supplement as to Jordan Linn Graham, United States v. Jordan Linn 
Graham (D. Mont. Mar. 9, 2015) (No. 9:13–cr–13–37–M–DWM) [hereinafter Order Denying Mot. 
To Supp.]. 
24 Opening Br. of Def.-App., at 6. 
25 Opening Br. of Def.-App., at 6–7. 
26 Opening Br. of Def.-App., at 8. 
27 Opening Br. of Def.-App., at 12. 
28 Answering Br. of Appellee, at 1–2. 
29 Answering Br. of Appellee., at 2. 
30 Answering Br. of Appellee., at 5. 





The issue to be addressed at oral argument is whether the draft 
instructions should be considered in the appeal, even though the district 
court had not actually used them to instruct the jury.  The defense claims 
to be “settling the record as to what happened” rather than introducing 
substantive proceedings.31 The defense wants the draft jury instructions 
in the record because they believe this information supports a review of 
their motion to withdraw the guilty plea. For that review, the defense 
intends to show that the prosecution acted in bad faith when offering the 
plea deal. Expect questions by the Court concerning the bad faith 
argument.   
 
B. Issue 2: Appeal of Conviction/ Withdrawal of Guilty Plea 
 
1. Arguments 
Graham makes four arguments in support of her appeal: (A) the 
prosecution breached the plea agreement by arguing for an enhanced 
sentence; (B) the defendant cannot now be sentenced fairly; (C) the 
prosecution unfairly used the threat of a mandatory life sentence to 
coerce the defense into accepting the plea; and (D) without a jury 
finding, the prosecution’s argument at sentencing about premeditation 
violates constitutional due process protections. 
 
I. The government breached the plea agreement 
 
Graham claims that the prosecution breached the plea agreement 
when, after accepting a plea to second-degree murder, they then argued 
for a sentence consistent with a first-degree murder judgment.32  This is 
in essence a request for the Court to reject their own plea deal by 
sentencing the defendant as a first-degree murderer anyway.33  Graham’s 
contention that the prosecution wants “to have its cake and eat it too” 
refers to this claim.34 The prosecution claims that its reasons for entering 
into the plea are irrelevant.35 Graham counters that it is relevant because 
a plea deal is “contractual in nature” and that a reasonable defendant in 
Graham’s position would not have accepted the plea deal knowing that a 
365-month sentence would be handed down.36 
 
A. Analysis 
                                           
31 Opening Br. of Def.-App., at 10. 
32 Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea, at 2. 
33 Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea, at 2. 
34 See supra FN 26. 
35 Answering Br. of Appellee, at 5–6. 
36 Reply Br. of Def.-Appel., at 5.  
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This claim underpins Graham’s appeal. Her theory is that the 
prosecution acted in bad faith, and that this bad faith directly caused the 
trial court to give Graham an excessive sentence. Their motion to include 
the draft instructions in the record is intended to add evidence in support 
of this theory. The prosecution does not even attempt to rebut the 
allegation of bad faith, dismissing it as “irrelevant.”37 This will likely be 
a subject raised at the oral argument. 
 
II. Defendant cannot be sentenced fairly 
 
Graham’s second claim is that the prosecution was allowed to 
make what would have been its closing arguments at trial to the judge by 
including them in the sentencing papers.38 Because the prosecution 
introduced the premeditation element at sentencing but not at trial, there 
is no way she can now be sentenced fairly to the lesser charge.39 
Therefore, Graham has a “fair and just reason” to withdraw her plea.40 




The fourth claim concerning due process (below) is directly 
related to this claim, because the defense is implying that the trial court 
judge was not able to sentence Graham fairly after the prosecution raised 
premeditation in sentencing. The standard for reviewing a sentence is 
“substantive reasonableness.”42 Since Graham’s sentence for second-
degree murder was within the sentencing guidelines43, the defense must 
make an exceptionally persuasive oral argument for the appeals court to 
question the trial court’s judgment.  
 
III. The prosecution unfairly used the threat of a mandatory life 
sentence 
 
Graham alleges misconduct when the prosecution “unfairly used 
the onerous threat” of a mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder 
to coerce the defendant into accepting the second-degree murder plea, 
only to argue for premeditation as a sentencing factor.44 The prosecution 
                                           
37 Reply Br. of Def.-Appel., at 5. 
38 Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Plea, at 2. 
39 Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Plea, at 2. 
40 Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Plea, at 2, citing Fed. R. Crim. P., Rule 11(d)(2)(B). 
41 Government’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion, United States v. Jordan Linn 
Graham (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2014) (No. 9:13–cr–13–37–M–DWM) [hereinafter Govt.’s Resp. in 
Opp.]. 
42 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
43 Trial Judgment; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.2 (2014). 
44 Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Plea, at 2–3. 
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denies misconduct and asserts Graham had ample reasons of her own to 




At oral arguments, this issue will probably not be prominent 
since the Court will likely only reach this issue if it is already persuaded 
that the prosecution breached the plea agreement.  
 
IV. The prosecution’s sentencing proposal violates due process 
protections 
 
Graham claims that the prosecutions sentencing arguments have 
“contaminated the entire sentencing process.”46 Since their plea offer was 
“nothing but an empty promise” and a way to avoid a possible 
manslaughter verdict, Graham’s rights were violated since a jury did not 




This claim is the key to Graham’s appeal, and will likely be a 
subject for scrutiny at oral arguments. The defense does a difficult dance 
to avoid directly accusing the trial court of error, but the substance of the 
claim is that the trial judge was unduly biased by the prosecution’s 
sentencing recommendation.  The alleged bias must have influenced 
Graham’s sentencing to a degree that the imposed sentence was 
substantively unreasonable. The chain of reasoning is speculative at best.  
                                           
45 Govt.’s Resp. in Opp. 
46 Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Plea, at 3. 
47 Def.’s Mot. to Withdraw Plea., at 3. 
